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Attention and Synthesis in Kant’s Conception of Experience 




In an intriguing but neglected passage in the Transcendental Deduction, Kant appears to link the 
synthetic activity of the understanding in experience with the phenomenon of attention (B156-7n). 
In this paper we take up this hint, and draw upon Kant’s remarks about attention in the 
Anthropology to shed light on the vexed question of what, exactly, the understanding’s role in 
experience is for Kant. We argue that reading Kant’s claims about synthesis in this light allows us 
to combine two aspects of Kant’s views that many commentators have thought are in tension 
with one another: on the one hand, Kant’s apparent commitment to naïve realism about 
perception and, on the other, his apparent commitment to the necessity of synthetic activity by 
the understanding for any kind of cognitive contact with external objects. 
Keywords: perception; conceptualism; non-conceptualism; naïve realism; Critique of Pure Reason; 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View  
1. Introduction 
In an intriguing footnote in the Transcendental Deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
registers the following complaint: 
I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected 
by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this. In such acts the 
understanding always determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination 
that it thinks […]. (CPR §24, B156-7n)1 
The context of this passage is Kant’s account of the ‘synthesis of the imagination’, which he 
presents as ‘an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the same 
time the ground of all others) to objects of intuition’ (B152). Our passage, then, implies that 
working out Kant’s views on attention could provide clues to the difficult question of what the 
                                                 
1 References to Kant’s works, with the exception of the Critique of Pure Reason, follow volume and page of 
the German Academy of Sciences edition (Kant 1902-). Quotations follow the translations in Kant (1998 
and 2007), with some modifications. References to the Critique follow the pagination of the 1781 and 
1787 editions, abbreviated A/B.  The following abbreviations are also used:  
Anth  Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798)  
H  Handwritten manuscript of the Anthropology  
CPR  Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787) 
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synthesis of the imagination is, and more generally shed light on the role of the understanding in 
perceptual experience. Moreover, our passage is not an aberration: in the Anthropology Kant goes 
so far as to identify the ‘faculty of apprehending given representations to produce intuition’ with 
attention (using the Latin gloss, ‘attentio’), as a function of the understanding (Anth 7:138). Our 
aim in this paper is to explore the interpretive path such remarks open. We argue that it leads to 
a promising and novel way of reading Kant’s views on perceptual experience. 
 Recent commentary on Kant’s views on perceptual experience has been dominated by 
the split between ‘conceptualist’ and ‘non-conceptualist’ camps. At the core of this debate is a 
disagreement over the role of the understanding in perceptual experience. In broad terms, non-
conceptualists argue that, for Kant, perceptual experience rests on a primitive level of awareness 
of external objects (identified with what Kant calls ‘intuition’, Anschauung), which involves neither 
concepts nor any synthetic activity by the understanding. Conceptualists reject this: on their 
view, all cognitive contact with the world of experience (at least for creatures like ourselves, 
neither gods nor brutes) involves concepts, or at least the understanding.2 
 As we will argue, our approach offers a potentially attractive middle ground between 
these two positions.3 On our approach, intuition, considered as a faculty for receiving a 
spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sensations, may indeed be independent of the 
understanding. Thus we are not committed to radical versions of conceptualism, according to 
which the understanding somehow constitutes sensibility, perhaps by giving it its spatiotemporal 
                                                 
2 The qualification is needed because some of the commentators that fall in this camp, including Béatrice 
Longuenesse and Henry Allison, distinguish conceptual from pre-conceptual acts of synthesis. McLear 
(2015) uses the term ‘intellectualism’ instead of ‘conceptualism’ to respect this distinction. We will use the 
more familiar ‘conceptualism’. 
3 Gomes (forthcoming) also argues for a middle ground between conceptualism and non-conceptualism, 
though in quite different terms and without consideration of the role of attention in Kant’s conception of 
experience; cf. Land (2011) and Ginsborg (2008) for acknowledgement of some of the insights and 
motivations of non-conceptualism in the development of what are ultimately conceptualist positions. 
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form (a view argued for by Longuenesse (1998), and at least implicit in Allison (2004), McDowell 
(1994, 1998) and Strawson (1958), among others).4  
To that extent, then, our approach is friendly to non-conceptualist readings of the 
Critique. But non-conceptualism comes in different flavours. According to commentators such as 
Allais (2015) and McLear (2015; forthcoming), the best way to develop non-conceptualism is to 
see Kant as a proponent of a naïve realist and anti-representationalist view of experience, of the 
sort defended by Martin (1998; 2002; 2006), Campbell (2002; 2014), Travis (2004), and Brewer 
(2011) among others.5 For reasons that we will explain below (in Section 2), we agree that a naïve 
realist reading of Kant is attractive. But a naïve realist reading of Kant ought to demand more of 
intuition than simply a spatiotemporally ordered manifold of sensations. Intuition, for the naïve 
realist, ought to acquaint us with the familiar objects of our naïve ontology, and indeed explain 
how we are able to cognise those objects. And, as we will argue, Kant’s view seems to be that 
intuition can play this role only as directed by the understanding. This is because, we will argue, for 
                                                 
4 An anonymous referee asks whether we take there to be wide and narrow senses of ‘intuition’ in Kant: 
the wide sense would be any sensible representation (and so may be one involving synthesis and concepts 
as well), while the narrow sense would be wholly independent of understanding. While our account is 
consistent with such a distinction, it does not require it. We need not read Kant as equivocating on 
‘intuition’: we can take there to be just one mental state that an intuition is, and recognise that it succeeds 
in acquainting us with ordinary objects only when it is guided by the understanding in acts of directed 
attention. We discuss this point in Section 4. 
5 A naïve realist view of perceptual experience is a relational view, according to which perception relates us 
to the ordinary three dimensional particulars of our naïve ontology. There are relational views which do 
not count as naïve realist, e.g. because the objects of acquaintance are claimed to be either sense data —
Russell (1911), O’Shaughnessy (2001) — or universals (Johnston (2006)). A naïve realist view of 
experience is anti-representationalist just in case the fundamental perceptual relation is non-representational, 
i.e. does not possess content and cannot be assessed as correct or incorrect, or accurate or inaccurate. 
While (as indicated in the text) some prominent non-conceptualists are also anti-representationalists, 
Hanna (2005; 2008; 2015) has developed a view which is non-conceptualist and naïve realist but 
nevertheless representational, by relying on a notion of non-conceptual content. We will indicate some 
points of contact between Hanna’s view and our own in what follows. Finally, there is also the possibility 
of conceptualist naïve realism, a position suggested by McDowell (2009; 2013).  
4 
 
Kant the paradigmatic instances of intuition putting us in cognitive contact with objects are acts of 
directed attention; and attention — as the quotation at the start of the paper suggests, and as we will 
further substantiate below — is directed by the understanding, in accordance with ‘the 
combination that it thinks’.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we set out the interpretive question we aim 
to address, and explain the apparent conflict between naïve realist and conceptualist readings of 
Kant’s views on perceptual experience. Then in Section 3 we develop the core of our positive 
proposal, which is based on reading Kant’s views on synthesis on the model of directed 
attention. Finally, in Section 4 we explain how our view bears on the broader debate over Kant’s 
views on perception. 
2. The Interpretive Issue 
Our aim in this section is to set out more clearly the interpretive problem we seek to address. As 
we already mentioned, a helpful way to approach the issue is by looking at the opposition 
between naïve realist and conceptualist readings of Kant’s views on perception. Accordingly, we 
will begin by going into a bit more detail on how this conflict appears to arise in Kant’s own 
texts. 
 Naïve realists can draw on two lines of evidence for their reading (for detailed 
discussions of the following passages, see Gomes (2014) and McLear (2015)). On the one hand, 
there are numerous passages where Kant affirms that sensibility — the faculty ‘which alone 
yields us intuitions’ (A19/B34) — relates us directly to objects (A19/B33; A50/B74), and is 
neither reducible to nor interchangeable with the understanding (A51-52/B75-76; A89-
90/B122). Moreover, since the core function of the understanding is judgment (A69/B94), this 
implies that the type of relation to objects that can be established through sensibility is 
fundamentally unlike judgment. And indeed, we find Kant affirming that the senses do not err, 
‘not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all’ (A293/B350). 
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 Furthermore, there is reason to think that Kant not only conceives of perceptual 
experience as fundamentally relational, but also that he conceives of it in terms of relations to 
ordinary external objects — ‘appearances’, in the transcendental (rather than the empirical) sense 
(A30/B45, A45-46/B62-63). In the first Critique’s Refutation of Idealism, Kant contrasts his own 
transcendental idealism with the ‘material idealism’ that he attributes, in distinct versions, to both 
Berkeley and Descartes (B274).6 He calls Cartesian idealism ‘problematic’, and portrays it as a 
sceptical position professing ‘our incapacity for proving an existence outside us […] by means of 
immediate experience’ (B275). According to problematic idealism, we are only ever immediately 
aware of the contents of our own minds, through inner experience; our grasp of a world outside 
our minds is indirect or mediated, and hence less secure. Thus in rejecting problematic idealism 
Kant rejects the idea that in perception our awareness of external objects is only indirect (see 
especially B277n). Combining this with the claim, already made plausible above, that Kant’s 
conception of perceptual experience is fundamentally relational, makes plausible a reading of 
Kant as a naïve realist, or someone who thinks that perceptual experience fundamentally rests on 
a relation of acquaintance to ordinary external empirical objects. 
 We agree that these lines of evidence make the naïve realist reading of Kant attractive. 
This is not the end of the matter, however. As is well-known, Kant in the Transcendental 
Deduction — and especially the second half of the B-Edition Deduction — revisits the relations 
between the understanding and sensibility with a view to securing the a priori applicability of the 
categories to objects of experience (A85/B117, B144, B159-160). This is where Kant’s notion of 
‘figurative synthesis’ or ‘transcendental synthesis of the imagination’ comes in. The imagination is 
explained here as ‘a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori […] in accordance with the 
                                                 
6 Allais (2015: 102) also draws on the Refutation of Idealism as a starting point for her own project. As 
Allais points out, any such reading of Kant will have to come to grips with Kant’s own idealism, and his 
repeated assertions that the objects we come into direct contact with in experience are, in some sense, 
‘mere representations’. For the purposes of this paper we bracket questions about the ontological 
implications of Kant’s views on perception, which Allais (2015) examines in depth. 
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categories’, and (as already mentioned in Section 1) its activity is characterized as the ‘first 
application’ of the understanding to the objects of intuition, and ‘the ground of all others’ (B 
152).  Thus not only is the understanding apparently capable of determining sensibility a priori, 
such determination is the ‘ground’ of all cognition of empirical objects.  
 Should these parts of the Critique worry naïve realist readers of Kant? Some ways of 
developing those ideas may suggest so. Sellars, for one, takes Kant’s official position to be that 
intuitions have conceptual content which, although not identical to the content of any possible 
judgment (and so not strictly truth-evaluable), is still intimately connected to such content.7 
McDowell (1994; 1998; 2009) — influenced by Sellars — also takes the content of intuition to 
be conceptual and closely related to the content of judgment.8 More recently, Griffith (2012) has 
argued that, although the sensory content of perception might be too fine-grained for our 
empirical concepts to capture, intuitions also possess pure categorial — and hence conceptual — 
content. Since such readings suggest that the way intuition relates us to the world is similar to (if 
not identical with) the way in which judgment relates us to the world (i.e. via conceptual content), 
they indeed seem incompatible with the core commitment of naïve realism to an irreducible 
perceptual relation of acquaintance.  
Much more could be said about each of these positions. But, since our aim in canvassing 
them was simply to give some context for our own project, we are not going to pursue them 
further here. On our view, both naïve realist and conceptualist readings of Kant not only have 
                                                 
7 According to Sellars (1967: 4-5), on Kant’s official position intuitions have conceptual content of the 
form ‘this F’, which can then be taken up in the perceptual judgment ‘this is F’. Sellars also recognises 
elements in Kant that point to a more radical non-conceptualist view of the deliverances of sensibility; but he 
takes these to be overridden in Kant’s final view by the doctrine of synthesis (Sellars 1967: 8 and 15). 
Gomes (forthcoming: 30) attributes a hybrid conceptual/non-conceptual view of perception to Sellars. 
Gomes is right that this is Sellars’s own view, but Sellars doubts that it is Kant’s view. 
8 In earlier work, McDowell (1994) took the content of perception to be identical to the content of 
perceptual judgment; more recently (McDowell 2009) he distinguishes between intuitional content and 
the content of judgment, in something like the way Sellars (1967: 4-5) does. 
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backing in the text, but also considerable philosophical interest. More specifically, we think that 
naïve realist readers make a good case that Kant thought of intuition as an irreducible and basic 
cognitive relation to objects. At the same time, we also think that conceptualists are correct in 
thinking that part of the aim of the Transcendental Deduction is to argue for an essential role of 
the understanding in perceptual consciousness.9 Thus, we hope to demonstrate the possibility of 
a reading that preserves insights from both. 
The approach we are recommending does not require that concepts (whether pure or 
empirical) enter into the content of intuitions. For all our approach says, intuition might lack 
content altogether — it might simply not be the sort of thing that can be assessed as correct or 
incorrect, or as accurate or inaccurate.10 Its function, instead, might be simply to relate us to 
objects. Our core claim rather is that, for Kant, intuition can play this role only if it is under the 
guidance of a faculty of attention. While a creature that lacks a capacity for directed attention may 
enjoy conscious sensory states (or ‘perceptions’, in the broad sense Kant introduces at 
A320/B376), the sensory states of such a creature would lack the objective cognitive significance 
that intuitions have for us. Since, as we will see, it is very plausible that Kant thought of attention 
as guided by the understanding, it turns out that the understanding does, after all, have a 
necessary and essential role in perceptual consciousness of external objects.11  
                                                 
9 It is important to note that the question is not whether the understanding has a role in experience 
(Erfahrung). For Kant, experience is ‘empirical cognition’ (empirische Erkenntnis: CPR B147, B165-6, 
A176/B218, A189/B234, B277; Anth 7:141 and 7:167 and H 7:398), which everyone agrees involves both 
intuitions and concepts. The question is whether the mere awareness of external objects in perception 
requires concepts or the understanding. 
10 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us to be clearer on this point. 
11 Though A320/B376 suggests a broad notion of perception as any conscious sensory state, this can be 
distinguished from perception in a narrower sense, which we argue involves directed attention.  See 
Tolley (2013: 122) for what we believe is a compatible point about the distinction between intuition and 
perception in Kant — where intuition is the work of sensibility alone, but perception is the representation of 
intuitions that puts one in determinate relation to an object; and see Matherne (2015) for a related case, 
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3. Attention and Synthesis 
As we saw above, the central text in support of conceptualist readings of Kant on perceptual 
consciousness is the Transcendental Deduction, and especially Kant’s talk of synthesis there. 
Our guiding idea is that Kant’s talk of synthesis is best understood in terms of the employment 
of basic capacities for exploration of one’s physical environment — paradigmatically, the capacity 
for directed attention.12 While Kant says relatively little about attention in the first Critique, he 
discusses it at length in the Anthropology. So we will first look at the Anthropology, in order to figure 
out how Kant thought of attention in concreto, as it were. Having thus equipped ourselves with a 
ground-level view of Kant’s conception of attention, we will turn to the discussion of synthesis 
in the Critique. We will argue that Kant’s discussion of synthesis fundamentally concerns the 
same sort of activity that goes by the name of attention in the Anthropology, only considered at a 
higher level of abstraction.13 
 
3.1 Attention in the Anthropology 
In Anthropology §3, Kant considers the ‘voluntary consciousness’ of one’s representations, which 
he says is possible either by ‘paying attention [das Aufmerken] (attentio) or […] turning away [das 
Absehen] from a representation of which I am conscious (abstractio)’ (7:131). This ‘turning away’, 
he elaborates, is a ‘real act of the cognitive faculty of holding off a representation of which I am 
                                                                                                                                                        
focusing on the role of imagination in perception — an angle that requires a particular focus on the A 
Deduction and Schematism. The compatibility of our account with those texts is too large a topic for the 
space allotted here. 
12 Although we often use the term ‘synthesis’ without qualification, we emphasise that our account 
concerns only the synthesis that according to Kant is involved in perceptual experience, and particularly 
as this claim figures in the B-edition Critique. Given the complexity of assessing the differences in style 
(and possibly also substance) between the separate versions of the Deduction in A and B, we cannot here 
take on the question of how our account of synthesis as directed attention relates to the ‘threefold 
synthesis’ of the A Deduction.    
13 For discussion of the related idea that experience requires attention by Kantian lights, see Roessler 
(2011).   
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conscious from combination with other representations in one consciousness’ — and on these 
grounds should be distinguished from distraction (7:131). This presents abstraction as a matter of 
stopping a ‘combination’ of representations that might otherwise obtain. Attention and 
abstraction are presented here as flip sides of the same coin: one attends as one disregards this or 
that. And this simply means that I could direct my attention in some other way, and I would 
accordingly combine representations differently. 
 Kant also observes that attention may or may not be voluntary. One’s attention can be 
seized — say by a strange birdcall, or a sudden stabbing pain in one’s tooth; and likewise, as far 
as involuntariness goes, one might give one’s attention indifferently — say, to whatever happens 
to fall within one’s line of sight as one walks down the street. By contrast, Kant takes it that the 
capacity to abstract ‘demonstrates a freedom of the faculty of thought and the authority of the 
mind to have the state of one’s representations under one’s control (animus sui compos)’ (7:131). At this point, 
Kant distinguishes abstraction from distraction — which, when intentional, can also be conceived 
as stopping a combination that might otherwise obtain: to get that annoying children’s television 
theme song out of my head, I might try humming another tune.14 Although both abstraction and 
deliberate distraction involve making it such that one does not have present to mind what one 
might have present to mind, with distraction it is a matter of some indifference where one’s 
attention may then settle: whatever does the trick, as long as the dreaded song no longer chimes 
away within. 
 In Kant’s account, then, attention is dynamically linked with abstraction — one attends 
as one disregards this or that — which accordingly presupposes a background of representations 
                                                 
14 Distraction is the ‘mere failure and omission’ of attention (7:131); later Kant says that it is ‘the state of a 
diversion of attention [der Zustand einer Abkehrung der Aufmerksamkeit] (abstractio) from certain ruling 
representations through its dispersal onto other, dissimilar ones’ (Anth §47, 7:206). There is an art to 
purposefully distracting oneself, Kant claims, that belongs to ‘mental dietetics’ (Anth §47, 7:208), and 
memorably points to ‘suitor who could make a good marriage if only he could overlook a wart on his 
beloved’s face, or a gap between her teeth’ (Anth §3, 7:131-2).  
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that are not attended, but could be. Kant develops this point as he considers, next, Locke’s 
famous complaint against the very idea of having representations without being conscious of 
them. Kant responds by suggesting that we can be ‘indirectly conscious’ of certain representations 
without being ‘directly conscious’ of them (Anth 7:135). The representations that we are directly 
conscious of are ‘clear’; but there is an ‘immense field’ of representations that we are only 
‘indirectly’ conscious of, which Kant deems ‘obscure’ (7:135).15 
 What does Kant’s talk of being ‘indirectly conscious’ of our representations amount to? 
There seem to be two ways to read Kant here. On one reading, Kant concedes nothing to Locke. 
His claim is just that, through some sort of theoretical argument, we can conclude that we have 
such unconscious representations. But although such reasoning might make us conscious that we 
have such representations, it would do nothing to make the representations themselves into 
conscious states. This reading is supported by the following statement: ‘The field of sensuous 
intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly 
conclude that we have them […] is immense’ (Anth 7:135). But Kant’s more phenomenologically 
inclined examples in this context suggest a slightly different reading. On this alternative reading, 
obscure representations are conscious — but dimly (or obscurely) so. They form the background 
against which clear representations stand out.16 
                                                 
15 Baumgarten refers to the ‘sum’ of obscure representations as the ‘FOUNDATION OF THE SOUL’ 
(Metaphysica §511), and suggests that what figures as obscure, versus clear (and possibly also distinct) in 
one’s sensible perception of things depends upon the position of one’s body (Metaphysica §513); he also 
points to attention and abstraction as powers that ‘reveal themselves’ not only in thought but also in 
sensible representation of the world (Metaphysica §625) — see Watkins ed. (2009: 116-118).  Although 
much of this is suggestive of Kant’s discussion of these topics in the Anthropology, it is not our project to 
work out how Kant both draws upon and distinguishes himself from his German rationalist predecessors 
on these topics.   
16 On our consciousness of obscure representations, see also Critique (B414-5n).  A further aspect of 
Kant’s account of the phenomenology of empirical consciousness in the Anthropology concerns the 
distinctness of one’s representations: this is clarity that extends to the composition (Zusammensetzung) of 
representations (Anth 7:138). Cognition (Erkenntnis) requires that ‘order’ is thought in the manifold, and 
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For present purposes it is not essential to determine exactly how Kant thought of 
obscure representations. What matters is that this discussion suggests a picture of attention, 
wherein attending is a matter of actively selecting some representations out of an ‘immense field’. 
Kant illustrates this type of attention in his example of a ‘freely improvising’ musician, who 
plays a fantasy on the organ with ten fingers and both feet and also speaks with someone 
standing next to him. In a few moments a mass of representations is awakened in his 
soul, each of which for its selection requires still a special judgment as to its 
appropriateness, since a single stroke of the finger not in accordance with the harmony 
would be heard as a discordant sound. (Anth 7:136) 
This is meant to illustrate the idea that clear and obscure representations stand in a foreground-
background relation, now specifically with regard to ‘sensations of hearing’ (7:136). But the 
example is complex on several counts, and we might first canvass a simpler case: you follow a 
busker’s tune across several train platforms in a busy station. Your task is keeping track of a 
patterned sequence of sounds, produced by an external object. In addition to this sequence of 
sounds, however, a host of other things impinge on your senses at the same time — the roar of 
an incoming train, public announcements, the sights and smells of the station. All of these 
representations, to the extent that they are conscious at all, form for you a single, ‘immense field’. 
The task of attention is to select from this field those that continue the tune you have been 
tracking, and to elevate them to the foreground of ‘direct’ or ‘clear’ consciousness. 
  How does this case bear on Kant’s example? One complication of Kant’s example is that 
the hearer is not a bystander: the musician is himself the source of the tune to which he attends.17 
                                                                                                                                                        
thus requires also distinctness in this sense (7:138). For present purposes, though, we are mostly 
concerned with the contrast of clear versus obscure representation. We also set to one side what clarity 
and distinctness mean when it comes to concepts.     
17 A further complication is that the musician is ‘multitasking’ — chatting away with someone as he 
improvises his tune. But this seems to be just a case of divided attention; as such, it does not raise special 
trouble for our purposes. 
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Nevertheless, our model still applies. The representations awakened in the musician’s soul as he 
begins to play form simply one more part of the immense field of obscure representations, along 
with any publicly audible sounds, visual and tactile perceptions of his environment, and any 
passing thoughts and feelings. The musician keeps track of the tune as he plays it, just as in our 
earlier example you were keeping track of the tune the busker was playing. His attention selects 
from the mass of representations in his soul, picking out those that can carry the tune forward. 
These are the representations he perceives clearly — and, presumably, the notes that he actually 
plays. Moreover, those notes are selected on grounds of their appropriateness, as ways of going 
on in accordance with principles of harmony. And as Kant implies by speaking of a judgment of 
appropriateness, he takes such guidance to be a job for the understanding.18   
The same general model of attention as selection seems to be part of what Kant requires 
for experience, at least as he presents it in the handwritten manuscript of the Anthropology. 
Consider the following passage, where Kant elaborates on the idea that experience is empirical 
cognition:  
Therefore experience is the activity (of the power of representation) whereby 
appearances are brought under the concept of an object of experience[;] and experiences 
are made by employing observations (intentional perceptions [absichtliche 
Wahrnehmungen]) and being reflective about their unification under a single concept. (H 
7:398) 
The idea that experience requires intentional perceptions is perhaps overstated: after all, as we have 
noted, Kant acknowledges that a person’s attention can be involuntarily grabbed by (e.g.) the call 
of an unfamiliar bird. However, we can read Kant as making the more modest claim that 
experiences are made through perception that is active, in the sense that involves selection via 
attention. We put ourselves in a position to know about an objective external world by actively 
                                                 
18 The model of attention as selection, which we are here attributing to Kant, plays a significant role in 
psychology and philosophy of mind; for an overview, see Wu (2014).  
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selecting which out of the immense field of representations potentially on offer to attend to and 
which to disregard. Moreover, these selections are not made at random, but rather follow certain 
principles or rules, and are thus unified ‘under a single concept’.19 
 We think these remarks from the Anthropology contain valuable clues about how Kant 
understands attention and its role in perceptual consciousness. Armed with these hints, we turn 
next to the Critique’s Transcendental Analytic. 
 
3.2 Attention and synthesis in the Transcendental Analytic 
Let’s return to the passage from the Deduction presented at the outset of this paper, quoting it 
now at further length: 
I do not see how one can find so many difficulties in the fact that inner sense is affected 
by ourselves. Every act of attention can give us an example of this. In such acts the 
understanding always determines the inner sense, in accordance with the combination 
that it thinks, to the inner intuition that corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of 
the understanding. (B156-7n) 
This note is appended at the end of a discussion of the ‘paradox’ that inner sense ‘presents even 
ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves’ (B152-
153), which is itself a coda to Kant’s discussion of the figurative synthesis. In particular, Kant’s 
resolution of the supposed paradox consists in arguing that through inner sense we are conscious 
of ourselves only insofar as our inner sense is affected by ourselves, and that this self-affection is an 
act of the understanding ‘under the designation of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination’ 
                                                 
19 In this last phrase (über die Vereinigung derselben unter Einem Begriffe nachgedacht (reflectirt) wird), 
Kant suggests that the subject must also stand to be reflective about the unification of the perceptions under a 
concept. We take it that this is also what Kant has in mind when he presents the ‘faculty of cognition as 
such’ as involving capacities of apprehension (there glossed attentio), abstraction, and reflection at Anth 7:138. 
Parsing that particular account of our cognitive faculty would require greater discussion of Kant’s 
conception of reflection than can be offered here. 
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(B153). The passage just quoted is meant to dispel the sense of mystery that might surround the 
notion of self-affection, by linking it to the phenomenon of attention. For present purposes, we 
are not interested in the details of how Kant proposes to resolve the ‘paradox’ of inner sense. 
What we are interested in is showing how the model of attention as selection that we recovered 
from the Anthropology can help make sense of Kant’s difficult notion of self-affection, and hence 
the ‘transcendental synthesis of the imagination’. 
Recall our freely improvising musician. As he begins to play, ‘a mass of representations is 
awakened in his soul’, to form part of the immense field of representations that he is (obscurely) 
conscious of. The crucial point here is that all of these representations — including those whose 
objects are ‘outer things’ — are, ipso facto, contents of his inner sense (A34/B50-51). The 
musician’s task, as we discussed, is to select those among them which accord with his grasp of 
the harmony he aims to produce — or, as we might put it, those which accord with ‘the 
combination that [he] thinks’. Moreover, as we saw, in selecting these representations he lifts 
them up from the field of obscure representations, and into (clear, direct) consciousness: in 
selecting them, therefore, he determines his own inner sense. On our reading, Kant’s talk of the 
understanding determining inner sense in acts of attention corresponds to the idea that attention 
involves selecting representations to bring into direct or clear consciousness. 20 Furthermore, 
Kant informs us, attention does not determine inner sense at random, but rather in accordance 
with the ‘combination that [the understanding] thinks’. We can interpret this claim just as we did 
in our discussion of the Anthropology: out of the immense field of representations that we could 
potentially attend to in each given perceptual setting, we select in accordance with principles — 
fundamentally, the Principles of the Pure Understanding that Kant derives from the categories. 
                                                 
20 This way of putting things presupposes that dimly or obscurely conscious representations are 
nonetheless conscious, rather than merely representations we can infer we possess. But this assumption is 
not essential. On the alternative, the job of selective attention would be to make the selected 
representations available to inner sense for the first time. 
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One point that deserves special emphasis is that, although according to Kant in acts of 
attention the understanding determines specifically inner sense, the objects of those acts of 
attention may well be outer.21 Our reading thus contrasts with Allison’s (2004: 284) reading of 
the same passage. Allison takes Kant’s claim that every act of attention provides an example of 
self-affection to be a slip of the pen: what Kant really has in mind, Allison contends, are only 
those acts of attention specifically directed towards the subject’s own inner states. By contrast, 
on our reading it is entirely straightforward that just the same sort of self-affection is involved in 
acts of attention whose objects are outer. Consider again the case of following a busker’s tune in 
a busy train station. Doing so requires selecting, from among the immense field of obscurely 
conscious representations in your inner sense, those that continue the tune. By selecting those 
representations, you bring them into clear or direct consciousness — thereby determining your 
inner sense.22 
 Moreover, and again in contrast to Allison’s reading, our approach makes good sense of 
Kant’s claim that acts of attention are merely examples of self-affection or synthesis. If this is so, 
we should expect there to be instances of synthesis which cannot, strictly speaking, be classified 
as acts of attention. And it is not hard to see why Kant suggests this. As we already saw, 
attention is used in the Anthropology as a gloss on ‘the faculty of apprehending given 
representations’ (Anth 7:138), and so it is restricted to empirical employments of sensibility. Since, 
however, Kant believes sensibility can also be exercised in non-empirical contexts, there is scope 
for a priori syntheses too. Consider this example, invoked multiple times in the Critique: 
                                                 
21 We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us to be clearer here. 
22 One might object that our reading does not obviously help with Kant’s main concern in B152-153, i.e. 
our knowledge of ourselves as appearances through inner sense. This topic is too large to tackle here. 
Schematically, we suggest the following. Through acts of attention (i.e. self-affection as we understand it), 
the cognitive subject constructs a perspectival, and egocentric take on the world. She is thereby in a 
position to know herself as the centre or origin of a point of view on the world. For a reading of Kant on 
empirical self-knowledge along similar lines, see Valaris (2008).  
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We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a circle 
without describing it […] and we cannot even represent time without, in drawing a straight 
line, […] attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which 
we successively determine inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of this 
determination in inner sense. (B154; see also B137-138 and A162-163/B 203-204)23 
How are we supposed to understand this ‘action of the synthesis of the manifold through which 
we successively determine inner sense’? In this case it cannot be a matter of selecting from 
among a field of given representations, since the context is the determination of sensibility a 
priori. But we still think that something like our model applies. 
Consider what you do when you visually attend to a moving object. Sometimes you 
might need to move your eyes or head in order to keep the object in view; but let’s set this aside, 
by assuming that the object is either small enough or far enough away. Even if you do not 
engage in such overt actions as moving your eyes and head, tracking a moving object still 
involves a clear sense of motion on your part: the focus of your attention shifts successively to 
take in different parts of your visual field. Accordingly, as you track the object the focus of your 
attention traces a figure in your visual field. Presumably, however, you can perform the same 
activity even abstracting from any given representations: if you have a capacity to direct your 
sensibility to trace shapes in space at all, there may be no reason why that capacity cannot be 
exercised a priori as well.24 
That something like this pure motion is what Kant has in mind seems to be confirmed 
by the following note, which occurs in the same context: 
Motion of an object in space does not belong in a pure science, thus also not in geometry 
[…]. But motion, as description of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the 
                                                 
23 The ‘attending’ in this translation renders Acht … haben.  
24 There is some empirical evidence that, in the absence of visual objects, attention does not trace 
continuous shapes through empty space (Pylyshyn 2011: 63); but this obviously has no bearing on what 
Kant may have thought on the matter. 
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manifold in outer intuition in general through the productive imagination, and belongs 
not only to geometry but even to transcendental philosophy. (B155n) 
In tracking an empirical object we trace figures in space by successively attending to different 
parts of the manifold of an empirical intuition. When doing geometry in our heads we employ 
the same capacities, only directed to the manifold of ‘outer intuition in general’. Indeed, Kant 
suggests that we can abstract not just from sensation, but even from space (and hence outer 
sense) altogether, and in that way ‘[m]otion, as action of the subject […] first produces the 
concept of succession at all’ (B155). 
 Thinking of synthesis on the model of directed attention proves fruitful when we turn to 
Kant’s account of the Principles of the Pure Understanding, and specifically the Analogies of 
Experience. Synthesis in the Analogies has often been read as concerning how we interpret the 
succession of our own sensations, so as to arrive at representations of an outer temporal order. 
Here is Longuenesse, for example: 
We believe that we perceive the succession or simultaneity of the states of things. 
Actually all we perceive (apprehend) is the succession of our representations, whereas the 
simultaneity and succession in states of things are not directly perceived. Rather, the 
representation we have of objective simultaneity and succession is the result of the way 
we interpret the succession of perceptions in our apprehension. (Longuenesse 1998: 335) 
The suggestion seems to be that we are first aware of our perceptions, as a sequence of mental 
events in us, and then from this awareness we somehow arrive at conclusions about the objective 
temporal order. But although the details of Kant’s positive account of temporal consciousness 
may be hard to decipher, this particular suggestion is plainly at odds with the text of the 
Analogies, which contains numerous passages that reject the idea that our awareness of objective 
temporality is derived from some prior awareness of an inner temporal order (e.g. A193/B238; 
also A182/B225-226 and A201/B246). 
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 Thus thinking of synthesis in the Analogies in terms of interpretation does not seem like 
a promising approach. Let’s see if we can do better with our alternative approach to synthesis as 
selective attention. The general principle of the Analogies, Kant announces, is that ‘experience is 
possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions’ (B218). 
Representing such a necessary connection, however, would not be possible through the merely 
haphazard uptake of sensory representations: ‘apprehension is only a juxtaposition of the 
manifold of empirical intuition [with] no representation of the necessity of the combined 
existence of the appearances that it juxtaposes’ (B219). Experience is possible, therefore, only in 
the ‘synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in one consciousness’ (B218), which is 
accomplished through ‘a priori connecting concepts’ (B219). 
 This is very abstract, but we can get a sense of what Kant has in mind by looking at some 
of his examples. In the Second Analogy (as stated jointly in both editions), Kant begins with the 
familiar idea that ‘apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive’ 
(A189/B234). But a random succession of perceptions is not yet sufficient for experience. Rather: 
I must […] derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of 
appearances, for otherwise the former would be entirely undetermined and no 
appearance would be distinguished from any other. The former alone proves nothing 
about the connection of the manifold in the object, because it is entirely arbitrary 
[beliebig]. (A193/B238) 
This point is illustrated by Kant’s notorious example of a ship being driven downstream 
(A192/B237-238). What is crucial in this illustration, we suggest, is that it provides an example of 
visually tracking a moving object. Clearly, if I am to keep track of the ship, my apprehension (the 
direction of my attention) must follow the movement of the ship: 
My perception of its position downstream follows the perception of its position 
upstream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship 
should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream. The order in the 
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sequence of the perceptions in apprehension is therefore here determined, and the 
apprehension is bound to it. (A192/B237) 
The sequence in which I apprehend successive glimpses of the ship cannot be haphazard, but 
must be ‘bound’ to the motion of the actual ship, as Kant puts it. To put the point in the terms 
used in our earlier discussion: from the immense field of representations on offer to me, I must 
successively select those that follow the motion of the ship. (This, in terms of the A193/B238 passage, 
is the ‘subjective sequence of apprehension’.) How am I to do this? Well, by ‘determining my 
inner sense in accordance with the combination that I think’ — that is, through my grasp of the 
ship as a persistent object following a determinate trajectory. I must grasp that the ship’s position 
at one moment is causally determined by its position at earlier moments, and direct my attention 
(select from among the immense field of representations on offer) accordingly. If I were not able 
to direct my apprehension in this way — ‘in accordance with a priori connecting concepts’ 
(B219), or the ‘objective sequence of appearances’ (A193/B238) — I would simply not be able 
to track the ship as it moves downstream. 
Similar remarks may be made about the concept of substance, which is the topic of the 
First Analogy. In the First Analogy, Kant indicates that to represent something as undergoing 
change there must be something that ‘always exists, i.e., something lasting and persisting’ 
(A182/B225-6). It is only with the representation of something persisting (‘das Beharrliche’) that 
it is possible to represent it as changing — and to keep track of it as it does — whether one is 
keeping track as it changes position in space, or else as it undergoes some alteration in quality. 
But there is no perception of this persisting substratum as such. Instead, we do things like track a 
ship as it changes its position. To track in this way, we apprehend (select) successive 
representations in a determinate order, guided by our grasp of the object in question as 
something that persists through change. 
For a different example, Kant contrasts the perception of a moving ship with looking at 
a house. While in this case too ‘the apprehension of the manifold that stands before me is 
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successive’ (B235), as Kant points out we do not experience the manifold of the house itself (its 
different spatial parts) as successive: rather, we experience them as all existing simultaneously, 
despite being unable to take them all in at one time. Moreover, unlike the case in which I track a 
moving object, there is no fixed order in which I must take in its various parts: 
[M]y perceptions could have begun at its rooftop and ended at the ground, but could also 
have begun below and ended above; likewise I could have apprehended the manifold of 
empirical intuition from the right or from the left. In the series of these perceptions there 
was therefore no determinate order that made it necessary when I had to begin in the 
apprehension in order to combine the manifold empirically. (A192-3/B237-8) 
The representation of a house is not given to me all at once — as it might be represented in a 
cubist painting, for example. Rather, I explore the house, whether merely visually, and at some 
fixed distance, or else by moving around and through it. And indeed, my experience of the 
manifold of the house as simultaneous rather than successive is linked to my awareness that the 
house is all there for me to explore however I please: I can choose to scan it from top to bottom, or 
from left to right.25 
We have been arguing that we should understand Kant’s claims about the role of the 
understanding in perceptual experience in terms of the idea that perceptual contact with objects 
requires directed attention. Our proposal accords with a further claim that Kant defends in the 
Anthropology: namely, that the capacity to enjoy experience is a cognitive achievement. In order to 
further illustrate our view, we will turn to this idea next. 
 
3.3 The ‘progress of perceptions’ 
The first book of the Anthropology is devoted to ‘the cognitive capacity’, and the first section to 
self-consciousness. Kant asserts here in rapid succession that it is because a human being ‘can 
have the “I” in his representations’ that ‘he is a person’ rather than a thing; that thought as such is 
                                                 
25 See also Kant’s similar remarks about the moon and the earth, in the Third Analogy (A211/B257). 
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essentially first-personal; and that the faculty of thought ‘is understanding’ (Anth §1, 7:127). He 
then notes that the capacity for thought, so conceived, is a developmental achievement; and he 
speculates that a child may be capable of genuine thought before he actually speaks in the first 
person (7:127). But how does the ‘I’ enter into a child’s representations, so that he is capable of 
genuine thought? Here Kant gestures towards a ‘progress of perceptions’ that has some ‘crude 
beginning’ in activities like tracking shiny objects, and expands ultimately to ‘cognition of objects 
of the senses, that is, experience’ (7:127-8). He concludes with the striking remark that childhood 
‘was not the time of experiences, but merely of scattered [zerstreute] perceptions not yet united 
under the concept of an object’ (7:128). It is this latter claim — that a capacity for experience is a 
developmental achievement — rather than Kant’s views on self-consciousness, that will concern 
us here.  
Notice, first, that Kant must be talking of early childhood — infancy, really: the time of 
working up from shiny object-tracking and the like. It might seem that Kant takes infants to be 
fundamentally distracted (zerstreut) — for he goes on to discuss attention (Aufmerken, glossed 
attentio) and distraction (Zerstreuung, glossed distractio) in the ensuing pages (Anth §3, chiefly). Let’s 
query this. An infant — call her Zoë — who is not more than a few days old can track with her 
eyes the movements of a white string against a black background. And we would intuitively 
describe her as doing so attentively, in some sense: it is fully occupying her, at least for a few 
seconds at a time. Now, the progress of perceptions to which Kant gestures begins with the 
‘apprehension of sensation [Apprehension der Empfindungsvorstellung]’ (7:127), which surely 
encompasses episodes like this. But the sort of attention exhibited in such episodes is evidently 
different from the attention that Kant takes to be required for full-blown experience. 
Zoë surely enjoys ‘apprehensions of sensation’, and so perceptions (in the sense of 
conscious sensory representations, as in A320/B376). Moreover, Zoë can even keep track of 
these perceptions to some extent. Thus, considered from the outside, her perceptions are not 
merely haphazard or random: they are the result of the tracking motions she makes with her 
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eyes; and these, we may assume, reliably respond to the movements of the string. And yet they 
remain ‘scattered’ in Kant’s terms, because they are not ‘united under the concept of an object’ 
(7:128). Zoë’s tracking is a mechanical impulse set into gear with the appropriate stimuli (of 
suitable size, and contrast against its background); it presupposes that certain raw resources have 
come online (e.g. suitably developed muscular reflexes) and that other enabling conditions are in 
place (she is awake, not hungry, not tired). This impulse is engaged as a reflex, much like the grip 
reflex infants manifest in closing their fists around objects. And this, we suggest, entails that even 
though Zoë’s perceptual states co-vary systematically with the movements of the string, she is 
not thereby aware of the string. 
How should we characterize the contents of Zoë’s consciousness?26 There are different 
options here, depending on one’s broader understanding of Kant’s views. Perhaps infants like 
Zoë possess a merely solipsistic consciousness, in the sense of McLear (2011: 3): they are only 
aware of their own sensations rather than of anything external. Or, perhaps, their consciousness 
enjoys at least spatiotemporal structure. In that case, they may be aware of shifting shapes and 
colour surfaces in a three dimensional landscape. For the second, richer option to be viable, it 
would have to be the case that spatiotemporal structure is independent of the understanding or 
apperception (the capacity for ‘having the “I” in [one’s] representations’), a topic we cannot 
discuss in this paper.27 
Suppose now it is a few months later and her father starts to play a game with her using 
this string — say it is the white string of the black hoodie that he wears most days. He dangles it 
in front of her; she tracks it assiduously. Quickly, he flicks it over his shoulder. Where did it go? 
She is no longer tracking the string. Maybe the father makes it clear that he is bringing it back: 
the same string. Zoë is conceivably in a position to recognise that the string could have been 
                                                 
26 We thank two referees for pressing us to clarify our position here. 
27 For a thorough recent discussion see McLear (2015), who argues that spatiotemporal structure is indeed 
independent of the understanding.   
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followed to the other side.28 She is now beginning to be able to react to the string, as opposed to 
just sudden or striking visual sensations. And what this example suggests is that, as part and 
parcel of this, she must be disposed to treat (e.g.) two temporally and spatially distinct 
impressions as belonging to the same persisting thing, and to anticipate where this thing might be 
located next, in light of its present location and state of motion. This capacity is significantly 
different from the capacities involved in neonate string-tracking, as it involves the agent’s guiding 
her attention in accordance with categorial concepts. This, we suggest, makes a difference to the 
status of the perceptions themselves: they are now, as they were not before, perceptions of the string. 
They carry objective reference. This is a result of the fact that they are now, as they were not 
before, guided by a capacity for directed attention.29 
4. Attention, Synthesis, and Naïve Realism in the Critique 
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, contemporary work on Kant’s views on perception 
appears to face a dilemma. On the one hand, there are reasons to favour a naïve realist 
relationalist reading of Kant on perception. One the other hand, there are also reasons to think 
that Kant takes the synthetic activity of the understanding to play an essential role in perceptual 
consciousness. Moreover, as we saw, prominent attempts to explain the role of the 
                                                 
28 Infants have been shown to be capable of this kind of expectation at six months of age or even younger 
(Pylyshyn 2011: 50). 
29 Our discussion of infant sensory consciousness here raises the question of what we would say about 
non-human animal consciousness. McLear (2011) has recently argued that Kant held that non-human 
animals enjoy sensory consciousness of external objects, and that this tells against conceptualist readings 
of Kant. We do not discuss non-human consciousness in this paper. What’s more, we do not think that 
one can extrapolate from the infant to the non-human animal case. According to Kant, infants are 
incapable of directed attention, and so their perceptions are ‘scattered’ (zerstreute). But it is not obvious 
that the same would have to be true of non-human animals: non-human animals may not be capable of 
giving their perceptions the kind of apperceptive or categorial unity that we can, but they are — as 
McLear (2011: 8) notes, citing Kant’s lectures on metaphysics (28: 689-90) — endowed with some form of 
the faculty of imagination, and so perhaps some capacity for directed attention. Their attention might take 
a merely Humean associative form, but this might suffice for some degree of objective reference. 
24 
 
understanding in perceptual consciousness turn out to be in tension with naïve realism. We 
would like to close this paper by revisiting this dilemma, in order to show how our approach 
might help to resolve it. 
To see this, it may help to contrast our view about the role of the understanding in 
Kant’s conception of experience with that of some prominent naïve realist readers of Kant. 
Allais (2015) and McLear (2015 and forthcoming) grant that full-blown experience (Erfahrung), as 
empirical cognition (see note 9 above), requires us to unify states of perceptual consciousness 
under concepts. However, on their view, the perceptual states (intuitions) that get unified under 
concepts carry their cognitive significance anyway — independently of any top-down influence or 
guidance by the understanding. More specifically, their status as states of acquaintance or 
awareness of external objects is independent of any such activity by the understanding. Intuitions — 
which, on the views under question, possess only spatiotemporal, and not categorial, unity — are 
supposed to provide us with representations of particular objects — where such a particular is a 
‘distinct, bounded thing to which the subject can pay individual attention’ or which ‘the subject 
can pick out as a unit’ (Allais 2015: 147n2, 154). 
But our reading suggests that this is not Kant’s view. We grant that sensory 
consciousness is possible without the understanding. However, Kant suggests, the states that get 
unified under a concept are not simply conscious sensory representations, but rather observations, 
which — as argued above — involve exercises of our faculty of selective attention.30 And, as we 
have already seen, selection via attention is directed by the understanding — in accordance with 
‘the combination that it [the understanding] thinks’ (B156-7n), or by the need for unity ‘under a 
                                                 
30 As mentioned earlier (note 4), an anonymous referee asks whether we think that sometimes Kant uses a 
wide notion of intuition, which includes synthesis and hence conceptual content. ‘Observations’ in the 
present sense would fit this bill, and our account is compatible with this suggestion. But we are not 
presupposing that observations (or intuitions in the wide sense) constitute a separate type of mental state 
in their own right: for all we have said here, observations may simply be intuitions in the narrow sense, 
deployed in a certain way. 
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single concept’ (H 7:398). This is because in attending to and tracking particulars in the world, 
we need to treat them as relatively persisting unitary objects that follow causally continuous 
trajectories through space. Thus the objective cognitive significance of intuitions is not there 
anyway, independently of their being unified (or, perhaps, independently of their potential for 
being unified) under concepts. On our reading, it is because we possess the capacity for directed 
attention — a capacity governed by the understanding — that we are capable of sensory states 
with objective cognitive significance at all. 
This, we believe, is an independently well-motivated suggestion. For, how much sense 
can we make of objective representations — representations of objects — that possess merely 
spatiotemporal unity? If we are to ascribe objective reference to a mental state, such as an 
intuition, then it must make a difference to the subject’s mental life that this state picks out a 
particular environmental object — as opposed to a different object, or just the play of her own 
sensations. What sort of difference? Allais provides some suggestions: 
It requires that the subject is able to discriminate the thing […] from other things and its 
surroundings. Typically, the subject will be in a position to attend to the thing, to track it, and 
perhaps to do things to it (such as reaching out and grabbing it), and move around it. (Allais 
2015: 154; emphasis added) 
This list points to a cluster of abilities that is plausibly more or less characteristic of objective 
perceptual reference. Part of the point of taking a subject to be aware of environmental objects — 
rather than, say, merely of her own sensations — is that she is able to keep track of such objects 
even through changes in the shapes and colours they project onto her retinas, and despite short-
term occlusions. The question for Allais, however, is whether this list of abilities can be 
explained by sensibility alone, independently of any categorially-grounded activity by the 
understanding. On the contrary, one might think, doing these things just is manifesting a capacity 
to direct one’s sensibility in accordance with the categories, by treating the objects one perceives 
as persisting and causally interacting substances. 
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 Non-conceptualists might be tempted to respond by impoverishing their conception of 
the objects of intuition: perhaps the things that intuitions relate us to are not the ordinary three-
dimensional objects of our naïve ontology, but rather momentary instantiations of manifest 
qualities, like fleeting colour patches and perspectival shape.31 If so, one might think, then 
perhaps the sorts of categorially guided capacities for attention we have been highlighting might 
not be necessary. Indeed, this seems to be McLear’s (2015, and forthcoming) view. In a 
somewhat similar spirit, Allais (2015: 147) points out that we can attend to and track particulars 
— like shadows, or spots of light on a wall — that are not full-blown material bodies. 
This, however, gets things backwards. For one thing, it is plausible that our capacity to 
attend to such insubstantial particulars as shadows, reflections, or momentary instantiations of 
sensory qualities is parasitic upon our capacity to attend to ordinary objects. In tracking a moving 
spot of light on the wall we are treating it as if it were an ordinary object, by expecting it to 
conform to rules of persistence and causal continuity that properly apply to such objects.32 If so, 
attending to insubstantial particulars is no less cognitively demanding than attending to ordinary 
objects. For another, taking this route would seem to run afoul of at least some of the 
motivations for reading Kant as a naïve realist. As suggested in Section 2, one such motivation is 
                                                 
31 An alternative non-conceptualist line is pursued by Hanna (2008; 2015). Hanna recognises the rich 
dispositional structure of acquaintance relations. As he puts it, ‘in being perceptually acquainted with the 
object I am directly acquainted with the whole worldly object via my whole living minded body’ (2015: 115). This aspect 
of his view is congenial to our own, and immune to our criticism. Instead of relying on the categories, 
however, according to Hanna the rich dispositional structure of acquaintance is grounded in non-conceptual 
perceptual and sensorimotor content. But the content Hanna requires for this role seems too rich to be non-
conceptual by Kant’s lights. For example, it involves ‘rules for the skilful manipulation of tools and the 
proximal or distal environment’ (2015: 106). But any such rules would clearly have causal content, and 
thus it is hard to see how Kant could have construed them as non-conceptual. 
32 An anonymous referee wonders whether this is correct. If, as we suggested earlier, it is possible for a 
pre-apperceptive infant to enjoy spatiotemporally structured consciousness, wouldn’t she be aware of 
such insubstantial particulars? The answer is no: she would be aware of surfaces of colour shifting from 
moment to moment, but not of their identity and persistence as they move about in space. 
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making sense of Kant’s rejection of Cartesian scepticism in the Refutation of Idealism. 
According to such scepticism, we are incapable of ‘proving an existence outside us […] by means 
of immediate experience’ (B275). On the reading in question, however, the ‘existence[s] outside 
us’ we could prove by means of ‘immediate experience’ would be restricted to such insubstantial 
particulars as momentary instantiations of perceptual qualities. This would seem to go counter to 
Kant’s argument in B275-276. Although this argument is obscure, it evidently turns on the claim 
that ‘all time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception’ (B275), which, as 
Kant’s glosses make clear, involves the perception of actual persistent external objects — not just 
insubstantial particulars. 
At the same time, however, we hope that our approach will have made it plausible that 
such defensive moves on the part of non-conceptualists are not necessary. This is because, as we 
promised in Section 2 of this paper, nowhere does our approach require that concepts figure in 
the content of intuitions. For all we have said, it is perfectly possible to think of sensibility as a 
faculty that allows us to stand in irreducible and contentless relations of acquaintance with 
external objects. It is just that it can only do so as directed by the understanding, in acts of 
attention.33 
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